r Ensuring the safe and effective FDA regulation of fecal microbiota transplantation
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has responded to the emergence of this therapy by deciding that fecal microbiota meets the statutory definitions for both a drug and a biological product, and as such, warrants regulation by the agency as a drug.
14 Drugs are defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) as 'articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, and articles (other than foods) that are intended to affect the structure and function of the body of man or other animals'. 15 The Public Health Service (PHS) Act defines biological product as 'a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition in human beings ' . 16 Biological products may be regulated as drugs under the FDCA, as biological products under the PHS Act, or under both laws. 17 The FDA's decision to regulate fecal microbiota as a drug has both positive and negative consequences. Broadly speaking, there is a clear need for oversight of the use of fecal microbiota for transplantation, given the risks posed by stool-borne transmissible illnesses. 18 The uniformity and expertise that the FDA can offer the industry are important institutional advantages both for stool providers navigating their legal responsibilities and for physicians seeking guidance on how to best help their patients.
However, the FDA's decision has proven problematic for scientific as well as legal and economic reasons. Not only does stool defy the typical scientific characterization that the FDA has long applied to small molecule and biologic drugs, but the potential do-it-yourself nature of the treatment poses particular concerns in the context of a regime involving periods of regulatory exclusivity. The goals of any regulation of FMT for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infection should be to optimize access to the therapy while maintaining strict screening and reporting standards and oversight. This Essay will first examine how regulation under the drug paradigm fails to achieve these objectives, and will then evaluate available policy alternatives for the FDA to pursue, ultimately concluding that the FDA should pursue a hybrid regulatory model much like the one it has implemented in the case of cord blood and other human tissues.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO FECAL MICROBIOTA TRANSPL ANTATION
First reported in Western medical literature in 1958, 19 FMT remained a fringe medical practice over the next 50 years. However, advances in molecular microbiology and the rising incidence and severity of C. difficile infection prompted a resurgence of interest in the therapy, especially as investigations consistently found that 90 per cent of recurrent C. difficile cases treated with FMT achieve clinical resolution. 20 FMT refers to the practice of transplanting a filtered stool preparation from a healthy donor into the lower gastrointestinal tract, typically via colonoscopy or enema, or the upper gastrointestinal tract, for instance by nasojejunal tube. Published protocols guide the screening of stool donors for transmissible diseases including hepatitis and HIV, 21 and the preparation of stool either for immediate use or for cryopreservation for later use. 22 These protocols call for the stool to be mixed with a saline solution, filtered to remove fibrous material, and either administered to the patient immediately or mixed with glycerol and frozen until the time of administration. Protocols for encapsulating stool have also been validated and published. 23 As mentioned above, systematic reviews and meta-analyses reviewing case series of FMT for recurrent C. difficile infection found that 90 per cent of patients were cured by the therapy. 24 By comparison, as noted above, first-line antibiotics treatments cure C. difficile infection 82 per cent of the time, 25 and after two or more recurrences, the cure rate of standard antibiotic therapies drops to below 40 per cent. 26 In the first clinical trial evaluating the therapy, FMT proved so superior to standard antibiotics that the study's data and safety monitoring board stopped enrollment early, concluding that it was unethical to withhold the treatment from the members of the control group. 27 Neither the systematic reviews and randomized trial nor a one-to two-year follow-up investigation found a link between FMT and any adverse events, though colonoscopy and upper routes of administration carry procedural risks. 28 However, even though studies concluding a year or two post-FMT (a timeline which is typical of many clinical trials) have reported no adverse events, diseases that have been linked to the microbiome may surface years after FMT. As such, there remains a need for more investigation of the safety profile of FMT in the extreme long term. 29 The mechanism by which the transplanted microbiota out-compete the C. difficile infection also requires further investigation. Analyses of microbiota communities before and after transplantation indicate that FMT addresses the lack of bacterial diversity in recurrent C. difficile patients and restores the composition of a normal microbiota 20 30 It was even demonstrated that the presence of a single bacterial strain of C. scindens could enhance resistance to C. difficile infection in mice. 31 These findings and others suggest the possibility of more targeted synthetic bacterial treatments of the infection, which companies including Seres Therapeutics are pursuing.
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While there is a paucity of data on the scale at which FMT is practiced today, OpenBiome, a public stool bank 33 that supplies fecal microbiota preparations for clinical use, has provided material for more than 4,000 treatments of recurrent C. difficile infection to 300 clinical sites across the USA since it first began operations in 2013. OpenBiome is also sponsoring a multicenter study of the long-term safety profile of FMT in recurrent C. difficile patients, under an Investigational New Drug (IND) application. 34 Beyond C. difficile, studies of the microbiome have revealed important relationships between intestinal bacteria and human health. 35 FMT for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infection represents a first foray into engineering the human microbiome to yield positive clinical results. Investigations into other applications of this therapy are underway, including testing FMT for the treatment of irritable bowel syndrome, inflammatory bowel disease, and a variety of metabolic diseases. 36 Companies such as Vedanta Biosciences are also pursuing targeted synthetic bacterial treatments of subsets of these indications.
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II. THE DIFFICULTIES OF REGUL ATING FMT AS A DRUG
In May 2013, the FDA held a public workshop on FMT at which they first confirmed that fecal microbiota would be regulated as a drug. 38 The FDA had written that while FMT 'may be ' Physicians and scientists, including representatives of the Centers for Disease Control and members of professional medical societies, quickly responded with concern to the FDA's decision. They argued that the available evidence supporting FMT's effectiveness as a therapy for refractory C. difficile infection was too compelling for regulators to restrict its availability to the treatment groups of clinical trials. 41 As such, just two months later, the FDA revised its decision and announced that it would exercise enforcement discretion when FMT was used to treat patients 'with C. difficile infection not responding to standard therapies'.
42 So long as the treating physician obtained adequate informed consent, the FDA would not require recurrent C. difficile patients to receive treatment through an FDA-reviewed clinical trial.
The FDA's decision not to enforce the IND requirement for recurrent C. difficile infection has significantly expanded access to the therapy, in no small part by creating a window in which public stool banks like OpenBiome could operate. 43 As a result, it has undoubtedly led to improved patient outcomes and reduced health care costs. A recent study of the cost-effectiveness of fecal transplantation has determined that it saves a conservative estimate of $17,000 per patient. 44 Public stool banks have developed protocols for screening and processing stool that are even more rigorous than previously published guidelines for directed donor fecal transplants, 45 and that can represent even more cost savings by spreading the costs associated with stool screening and preparation over many treatments. 46 However, the long-term regulatory outcome for FMT remains unclear, and as will be explained infra, if the FDA proceeds along its current pathway, the most likely outcome is one in which a single provider receives a license from the FDA to produce fecal microbiota for transplantation, at which time the FDA will likely no longer exercise its enforcement discretion.
There are several problems with this outcome, each of which we will address in further detail in the sections to follow. First, to effectively regulate stool as a drug, regulators will need to address the challenge of characterizing active ingredients and guaranteeing safety and quality in spite of the variability of stool. 47 The FDA has not yet publicly explained how it plans to address this challenge. will likely impose significant burdens on the health care system, burdens that the FDA has not yet faced with other therapies. As an initial matter, it is probable that a license to produce fecal microbiota for transplantation will have the effect of granting market exclusivity to a single provider for the provision of ubiquitous human stool. Yet, in this case, like only a very few others, doing so would allow that provider to capture value from knowledge that already exists in the public domain, and is already being used by multiple providers to meet an urgent and growing public health need. This outcome would work against the public interest by inhibiting treatment choices for patients and raising prices across the health care system. When combined with the do-it-yourself potential of FMT, the decision to regulate fecal microbiota as a drug may impose safety risks that are unique to this therapy and do not arise in the context of other, more traditional drugs. Third, given the relative freedom with which clinicians may prescribe drugs off-label, regulating stool under the traditional drug paradigm may also discourage investment into explorations of fecal therapies for other indications, if off-label uses of fecal microbiota can meet demand from patients with those conditions to which researchers have made tentative links to microbiome health. This concern is not unique to FMT, but is worth attention because in this case the FDA has the ability to select an alternative regulatory paradigm that would mitigate, if not eliminate, this result.
A. Scientific complexities
From a scientific perspective, the regulation of stool as a drug is complicated by the material's complexity and inconsistency across samples. The microbial and metabolic contents of human stool are known to vary enormously across individuals and over time within individuals. 48 Unless the active components are identified, purified, and tested, it will not be possible to guarantee that the product is consistent across batches.
This characteristic suggests that the regulation of stool should be tied to the process by which it is prepared for transplantation, rather than to the variable contents of the product. 49 However, in the case of human stool, this 'process' not only includes preparation methods following stool collection; it is also driven by the complex and very specific life history of the individual donors, and might arguably be defined by the donors themselves. 50 More practically, the 'process' associated with preparing fecal microbiota for transplantation could be narrowly defined by the very particular methods used to filter and prepare stool from donors who are selected in accordance with a consistent protocol.
Thus, under the drug regulation paradigm, given the characteristic variance of stool, the FDA would be underregulating stool from both a safety and an efficacy perspective should it simply provide traditional drug licenses to stool-based products. Stool preparations have distinct compositions and resultant therapeutic properties, and they also carry distinct pathogenic threats, and thus warrant ongoing safety monitoring and evaluation beyond that which typically accompanies an approved drug. 49 The FDA currently regulates many biologic drugs in this fashion, regulating not simply the compound itself but the process by which the drug is produced. 50 David, supra note 48, at 1-2.
importantly, it would be inappropriate to provide licenses that bear little relationship to the specific donor screening or stool preparation methods used by the stool provider. Instead, an approach that narrowly defines the process by which stool material is assessed and prepared for fecal transplantation would be more consistent with our understanding of the extreme complexity of the microbial system. However, the standard drug paradigm does not clearly allow the FDA to specify who may donate stool and which pathogens must be screened for. It is important that these complicated issues, many of which are still not well understood by science and medicine, be considered in a public regulatory context, rather than in the FDA's private negotiations with a single company.
B. Exclusivity problems
Other problems with the FDA's decision to regulate FMT as a drug stem from one of the FDA's often-overlooked powers: its statutory requirement to award periods of exclusivity for approved drugs under a variety of conditions. As one example, the Orphan Drug Act awards seven years of marketing exclusivity to FDA-designated orphan drugs, 51 during which time the FDA may not approve a new or generic drug application for the same product and indication. 52 The recently enacted Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act goes further, providing 12 years of data exclusivity for reference biologics, during which the FDA may not approve an application for a biosimilar product that relies on the innovator company's clinical trial data. 53 Although the appropriate lengths of exclusivity periods like these have been hotly contested, 54 there is general agreement that in many cases an exclusivity period helps provide innovative drug manufacturers with sufficient incentives to carry new products through the long, expensive, development process. 55 The Orphan Drug Act is the paradigmatic example: where the market for a drug is by definition small, a long exclusivity period helps assure pharmaceutical companies that they can recoup their investment into a drug for treating an orphan disease. 56 Exclusivity then functions to raise the price of the drug above what it would be in an otherwise free market, but this is a social bargain that has been made for purposes of allowing companies to capture more of the value that they generate through innovation, incentivizing them to engage in innovative drug development activities that would not otherwise have occurred. But sometimes this bargain breaks down. In some cases, the FDA has approved a drug when that very same drug was already widely, cheaply available on the market. The FDA's approval and grant of an exclusivity period in such cases may function to clear the market of existing therapies, permitting the new applicant to charge monopoly prices without fulfilling their end of the social bargain and bringing a truly new product to market. Scholars have been concerned about two such cases that have occurred recently, with disparate outcomes.
The story of colchicine, a drug used to treat acute gout flares, has likely been the most widely reported. Colchicine had been widely and cheaply available in generic form since the 1800s, 57 long before the FDA began regulating the safety and efficacy of drugs. As such, even after the FDA acquired such authority in 1962, 58 many drugs that were already on the market remained publicly available, although they were never formally evaluated by the FDA. A pharmaceutical company decided to invest in conducting a series of trials involving colchicine, to demonstrate its safety and its efficacy for gout as well as for an orphan disease known as familial Mediterranean fever.
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In 2009, the FDA approved the use of colchicine for these indications, and under the Orphan Drug Act the manufacturer received seven years of marketing exclusivityfor a product that was already on the market. 60 The manufacturer and the FDA subsequently took legal action to force all other makers of colchicine to exit the market, 61 and the manufacturer then raised the price per pill from about $0.09 to $4.85. The grant of exclusivity resulted in significantly increased costs not only for patients but also for Medicare and Medicaid, common payers for the drug. Scholars have persuasively argued that the rewards granted to colchicine's now monopoly supplier vastly exceed the value of the information provided to the public, and that public health is likely to suffer as a result.
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Another recent example involves a synthetic hormone used to reduce the risk of preterm births in pregnant women with a history of preterm births. The hormone had been available to women in compounded form for many years, and it was relatively inexpensive, at $15 per injection or $300 per pregnancy. 63 But in February 2011, the FDA approved Makena, a branded form of the hormone, for this orphan indication. The marketing company first set a price roughly 100 times higher than that of the compounded therapy, for a total cost of almost $30,000 per pregnancy. Although they later cut that price in half, the cost still vastly exceeded the cost of the compounded form. In this case, though, Makena's maker could not secure a monopoly over the distribution of the hormone. Although the FDA could not have approved another manufacturer's application under the Orphan Drug Act, the FDA stated that it would decline to take enforcement action against pharmacies that compounded the drug for patients unless safety problems were reported. 65 This unusual decision was likely driven by several motivations. Historically, the FDA has had a complicated relationship with compounding pharmacies-its regulatory authority in this area is unclear, and the FDA's exercise of its enforcement discretion in this case avoided a legal battle with the compounding pharmacies. However, the FDA was also likely motivated by concerns about patient access, having observed the results of the colchicine case.
If the FDA continues in its efforts to regulate fecal microbiota as a drug, it may soon be required to make a similar choice in the case of FMT. Responding to an application from a company called Rebiotix, the FDA has recently designated 'fecal microbiota' as an orphan product for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infection. 66 Rebiotix is currently conducting clinical trials in an effort to gain FDA approval, 67 and if it is successful, the Orphan Drug Act would prevent the FDA from approving another manufacturer's application to process and distribute whole stool material for FMT, barring a showing of clinical superiority.
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The question then becomes whether other stool banks would be able to stay in business, as in the case of Makena, or whether they would be forced out of the market, as in the case of colchicine. In our view, the FDA ought to continue exercising its enforcement discretion and permit other stool banks to remain as market participants, analogous to its behavior in the Makena case. However, the FDA certainly faces countervailing pressures. Perhaps most obviously, the FDA has prioritized the removal of unapproved drugs from the market. 69 The FDA would also likely be sued for this 65 . Although it might be supposed that the preparation of stool for FMT is more akin to compounding than it is to the production of colchicine, and therefore that stool banks might be able to evade the exclusivity requirements in the way that compounding pharmacies have, this is unlikely. Unlike compounding pharmacies, no stool banks have argued that their activities lie entirely outside the FDA's regulatory authority. Our argument here is simply that the FDA has selected a suboptimal regulatory paradigm.
behavior, as it was in the Makena case. 70 Also, given the FDA's past attempts to curtail its use of enforcement discretion in the FMT context, it is difficult to think that it would be likely to continue exercising its enforcement discretion here.
Even if the FDA did continue to exercise its enforcement discretion after granting Orphan Drug exclusivity to one company, the award of exclusivity itself would likely spell trouble for other stool banking operations. In the case of colchicine, recall that before the FDA took action, the approved company independently brought suit against other colchicine manufacturers, seeking to force them to exit the market. 71 Should the approved FMT company do the same, even if it would not be likely to win such a suit, 72 the time and expense required by litigation would likely have an adverse effect on the ability of existing stool banks to continue providing care, especially given their nonprofit approach.
Importantly, the possibility of having a single stool provider on the market in itself is not a problem. The survival of any particular FMT company is incidental to the primary goal: to ensure patients have access to safe, effective treatments. The problem, rather, is two-fold. First, to the extent that the prospect of granting exclusivity in the colchicine and Makena cases has troubled scholars because the reward received by companies would be disproportionate to the social contribution made, exclusivity for FMT raises the same concerns. But second, and even more troubling, is a factor unique to FMT: the potential for do-it-yourself treatments. Since monopoly power leads to monopoly prices, if Rebiotix chooses to sell patients stool for thousands or tens of thousands of dollars, 73 depending on health insurance coverage, 74 patients may resort to essentially free at-home transplantations, using friends or family members, screened at the patient's discretion, as donors. The problem is a simple one of trading off access, cost, and safety. At a low price, access can be assured. But at a high price, the prospect of a monopoly FMT system poses significant safety concerns.
C. Safety concerns
As we have explained, FMT as a therapy is unique for the difficulty of its characterization and the simplicity of its production, and each of these characteristics raises special safety concerns. First, the complexity of the microbial community in stool and the variability across stool samples makes it nearly impossible to guarantee the contents from batch to 70 Makena's maker argued that the FDA had violated its own rules by not exercising its enforcement authority over the compounding pharmacies. But before the courts could officially decide the case, the parties settled. . Fidaxomicin, another common antibiotic, costs twice as much. 74 Today, to our knowledge no insurer covers the use of frozen, ready-to-use fecal microbiota preparations.
batch. As such, ongoing monitoring for the presence of possible pathogens is necessary for maintaining a safe product and should either be considered part of the approved manufacturing process or a condition imposed on manufacturers. Second, although there is little chance that patients will manufacture traditional small molecule therapies in their bathrooms, processing stool for transplantation at a basic level requires very little training or equipment. Instructional guides produced by non-professionals and posted on YouTube have received tens of thousands of views. 75 Patient support groups and online forums include lengthy step-by-step instructions along with discussions of best practices for mixing stool in a low-cost blender and administering it via enema. The risk with any regulatory strategy that restricts access to this therapy, whether by raising barriers to clinical practice or by supporting monopolistic pricing, is that it will motivate desperate patients to pursue self-treatment. 76 Unsupervised, do-it-yourself treatments carry considerable risk of the transmission of pathogens from improperly screened and handled stool. Few healthy individuals would be deemed eligible for donating stool for fecal transplantation. Only six per cent of prospective donors to OpenBiome pass the full screening process, which includes a 109-item clinical assessment administered by a nurse or physician, and 30 stool and blood screens. 77 With a lack of long-term safety data on patient outcomes post-FMT, it is prudent to be overly cautious about screening for diseases that are potentially mediated by the microbiome; for instance, researchers have notably linked the microbiome to obesity, 78 metabolic syndrome, 79 and behavior. 80 Similarly, it is just as important to collect longitudinal safety data to identify any conditions that may be transmitted via stool of which we are unaware. 81 Thus, given the known and unknown risks that come with improper donor screening and inadequate patient follow-up, the ease with which patients may prepare and administer fecal transplants themselves without medical supervision, any regulatory outcome that results in restricted access by either limiting supply or significantly increasing the cost of therapy should be adopted extremely cautiously.
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III. TOWARD AN IMPROVED PARADIGM FOR FMT REGUL ATION
As we have explained, while FMT may fall within the broad statutory definition of 'drug', 83 there are reasons to be concerned about regulating it wholesale under that paradigm. In the past, when similar concerns have arisen for other technologies involving human cellular or tissue-based products of various types, the FDA has adopted or developed alternative regulatory paradigms. It should also consider doing so here. There are several potential paradigms available, each with their own advantages and disadvantages.
A. Blood Although blood, like FMT, facially appears to qualify as a 'drug' under the FDCA, the FDA has promulgated regulations establishing an entirely separate system for regulating blood and blood products as biologic products under the PHS Act. This regulatory system is largely focused on ensuring the safety of the blood supply, with the FDA restricting the possible donor pool 84 and requiring extensive testing and quarantine of donated blood before it can be transfused. 85 The FDA also regulates blood banks themselves, with highly specified registration and facility requirements. 86 Yet, generic licenses are issued to banks meeting requirements, rather than being awarded exclusively to one or a small number of institutions. In many ways, the FDA regulates blood more like a commodity, rather than a therapeutic compound. 87 The FDA's regulation of whole blood and blood products is in some ways an artifact of history, however. Blood transfusions were routinely performed in the 1800s, and the discovery of blood typing in the early 1900s greatly improved the safety and efficacy of the treatment. 88 By the time the FDA officially acquired the authority to regulate blood in 1970, 89 the safety and efficacy of transfusions was beyond question. A far greater concern, in the FDA's view, was the potential for scarcity. Unlike most traditional drugs, production of blood cannot easily be scaled up. It relies on donors, and the possibility of granting exclusive licenses to certain banks would be unthinkable, in light of the potential human cost. The FDA's commitment of resources to create blood's existing regulatory structure must be understood in the context of this history. Blood and fecal microbiota share many scientific characteristics that distinguish them both from traditional drugs. Unlike traditional drugs, blood and fecal microbiota pose safety concerns involving transmissible diseases. Further, in both cases we ought to be concerned about the potential for scarcity, due to the need at present to procure both blood and stool from human donors. And just as the efficacy of blood and blood products was known and appreciated prior to the FDA's involvement in this area, FMT's efficacy for at least one indication-recurrent C. difficile infection-has already been demonstrated.
Yet, blood and fecal microbiota are distinct in at least one important way: unlike blood, scientists believe that FMT may be useful for a wide range of potential indications that implicate the human microbiome. Some of these, such as ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease, may naturally be suspected due to FMT's locus of action. Yet others, like Parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis, and childhood regressive autism, 90 are also potential indications. Research into these indications but also into the microbiome more broadly is desperately needed, and the current paradigm for regulating blood is not set up to oversee such clinical examination.
Instead, then, we might look to another regulatory paradigm whose history more closely resembles that of FMT. Specifically, FMT's development quite strongly resembles the history of the use of cord blood, whose potential to treat a range of diseases was not discovered until the 1980s. 91 Cord blood, which is regulated by the FDA under its related oversight system for human cells and tissues, is a second potential model for FMT.
B. Tissue
Blood is not the only therapeutic that the FDA has carved out of its system for regulating traditional drugs. The FDA has also issued special regulations for human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products or HCT/Ps, which are 'human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient', 92 a group that includes bones, ligaments, skin, and cord blood. 93 Like blood, these human tissues are regulated as biological products under the PHS Act, in which the safety of the specimen is paramount. 94 But for HCT/Ps and specifically for cord blood, the FDA has chosen to regulate different uses in different ways. 90 See Sha, supra note 20, at 1028. 91 Specifically, where banked cord blood is intended for use by its donor or that donor's close relatives, that cord blood is regulated like general whole blood, as a biological product, in a way that prioritizes the safety of the process. Accordingly, private cord blood banks must be registered and licensed much like typical blood banks, and they must comply with all tissue regulations. Cord blood stored for personal use may be used for any indication. Where cord blood is intended for use by a patient unrelated to the donor, however, it is regulated both as a biological product and as a drug. 95 This means that cord blood when sourced from an unrelated donor must be approved for use under an IND or BLA for the requested indication, a process that might involve extensive clinical trials. To put it succinctly, for cord blood, FDA regulation is concerned with both the intended recipient and the intended use, toggling the type and level of regulation along both dimensions.
A key virtue of adopting the HCT/P approach in the FMT context is that it would permit the FDA to regulate different uses of FMT differently. There is already strong evidence to suggest that FMT can be safe and effective for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infection. 96 However, whether FMT can be safe and effective for the treatment of other indications is not known. As such, the FDA might use their hybrid approach to regulating HCT/Ps like cord blood as a guide. In effect, choosing to regulate FMT as a biological tissue product would allow the FDA to permit its use in treating recurrent C. difficile infection, while still requiring additional proof before it could be prescribed for other indications.
Adopting the HCT/P regulatory paradigm wholesale would, however, permit individuals to bank and use their own stool or stool from any first-or second-degree relatives for any purpose. As such, regulators ought to be concerned about the potential for this carve-out to reduce the benefits of adopting the HCT/P approach in terms of regulating different indications in different ways. Arguably, though, it is preferable for individuals who are determined to use FMT for unapproved indications to do so through a process that at the very least minimizes the safety concerns associated with the therapy. If no such exemption existed, the reality is that patients would undergo FMT in an unregulated, do-it-yourself fashion, not that they would be unable to undergo FMT at all. The FDA has faced this same tradeoff in the context of semen, which has similar potential for at-home administration. The FDA therefore imposes fewer and less strict requirements on directed sperm donors than on anonymous donors. 97 In order to regulate the safety of FMT along the same lines as either blood or tissue, though, the FDA would need to either interpret or amend its existing regulations. At present, although fecal material qualifies as a biological product, the FDA's Tissue Reference Group has recommended that it does not meet the statutory definition of an HCT/P and therefore could not at present be subsumed within the relevant regulations. 98 The Reference Group did not publicly explain their reasons, but a close reading they faced in the cord blood context. 106 Given the potential for publicly reported adverse events that may be attributed to the underregulation of processing and storage of stool samples, the FDA might be willing to take such actions, but it is by no means clear at this time. If they are not willing to devote the resources, a third option-simple continued use of enforcement discretion-might be even more attractive.
C. Enforcement discretion
As discussed above, the FDA has currently chosen to use its enforcement discretion to de facto permit physicians to provide FMT for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infections. If the FDA continued to exercise this discretion, it would be able to achieve a similar outcome as it could achieve in the HCT/P context. That is, physicians would be free to provide FMT to treat C. difficile infections not responding to standard therapies, but a company hoping to market FMT for other indications would still need to complete clinical trials.
Importantly, if the FDA chose to continue exercising its enforcement discretion for FMT for recurrent C. difficile, health care providers would not be without expert advice on the subject. Professional organizations like the American Gastroenterological Association have issued best practice guidelines for FMT, including restrictions on donor selection, sample processing, and facilities management. 107 The FDA's regulation of blood products provides a helpful example. In that context, private standard-setting organizations like the American Association of Blood Banks had already begun to regulate the blood supply before the FDA was involved in the process, a role which the professional association continues to fulfill today. Although these guidelines lack the legal force of the FDA's regulatory scheme, they are not toothless. Physicians subject to malpractice actions who have failed to adhere to guidelines that represent the standard of care may be subject to professional discipline. By extension, stool banks would face pressure to demonstrate compliance with best practice guidelines from the clinical sites and insurers using their services.
A key virtue of this approach is that it permits the FDA to postpone the off-label prescription problems that might arise if it does approve Rebiotix's FMT application. Essentially, although manufacturers are not permitted to advertise their products for off-label uses, doctors are free to prescribe therapies and devices for off-label indications, with one study suggesting that about 20 per cent of all drugs are prescribed off label. 108 Too often there is no scientific support for off-label prescriptions, and with a grant of exclusivity, the manufacturer has little financial incentive to conduct further validating studies. Because approving FMT for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infections would permit physicians to prescribe it for all other unproven indications, it would perversely delay the FDA's acquisition of the very information it wants most-data on the
